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LEIBNIZ VS ISHIGURO: CLOSING A
QUARTER-CENTURY OF SYNCATEGOREMANIA
TIZIANA BASCELLI, PIOTR B LASZCZYK, VLADIMIR KANOVEI, KARIN
U. KATZ, MIKHAIL G. KATZ, DAVID M. SCHAPS, AND DAVID SHERRY
Abstract. Did Leibniz exploit infinitesimals and infinities a` la
rigueur, or only as shorthand for quantified propositions that re-
fer to ordinary Archimedean magnitudes? Chapter 5 in (Ishiguro
1990) is a defense of the latter position, which she reformulates in
terms of Russellian logical fictions. Ishiguro does not explain how
to reconcile this interpretation with Leibniz’s repeated assertions
that infinitesimals violate the Archimedean property, viz., Euclid’s
Elements, V.4. We present textual evidence from Leibniz, as well
as historical evidence from the early decades of the calculus, to un-
dermine Ishiguro’s interpretation. Leibniz frequently writes that
his infinitesimals are useful fictions, and we agree; but we shall
show that it is best not to understand them as logical fictions;
instead, they are better understood as pure fictions.
Keywords: Archimedean property; infinitesimal; logical fiction;
pure fiction; quantified paraphrase; law of homogeneity
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1. Logical fictions
If a publisher were to announce to the public that in addition to its
fiction titles, it offers a variety of cookbooks as well, no one would in-
terpret this as meaning that the fiction titles turn out to be cookbooks
in disguise when their content is properly clarified and made explicit.
Yet when Leibniz announced that “il ne faut pas s’imaginer que la
science de l’infini est . . . reduite a` des fictions; car il reste tousjours
un infini syncategorematique”1 [Leibniz 1702a, p. 93], H. Ishiguro pro-
posed just this type of interpretation of Leibnizian fictions in terms of
a Weierstrassian cookbook.
Twenty-five years ago Ishiguro presented her interpretation of Leib-
nizian infinitesimals as logical fictions [Ishiguro 1990, Chapter 5]. Ishig-
uro’s interpretive strategy employs what Russell called logical or sym-
bolic fictions [Russell 1919, pp. 45 and 184].
Her analysis has not been seriously challenged. The situation has
reached a point where the literature contains statements of Ishiguro’s
hypothesis as fact, without any further attribution, as in the following:
Robinson’s infinitesimal is a static quantity, whereas
Leibniz’s infinitesimals are “syncategorematic,” i.e., they
are as small as is necessary, such that there is always a
quantity that is smaller than the smallest given quantity.
[Duffy 2013, p. 15]
Such a syncategorematic reading of Leibnizian infinitesimals is en-
dorsed by Leibniz scholars Arthur, Goldenbaum, Knobloch, Levey,
1This passage is discussed in more detail in Subsection 7.1.
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Nachtomy, and others, as detailed in Subsection 2.2 below. Recent ad-
vances in Leibniz scholarship suggest the time has come to re-evaluate
her interpretation. This text presents a number of difficulties for the
thesis that Leibnizian infinitesimals are logical fictions.
1.1. Defending Leibniz’s honor. The context for Ishiguro’s analysis
was the general sense that no appeal to infinitesimals a` la rigueur could
stand philosophical scrutiny. More specifically, her reading is based
on the premise that prior interpretations of Leibnizian infinitesimals,
in the spirit of the infinitesimals of Bernoulli and Euler, must surely
involve confusion or even logical inconsistency. This premise is spelled
out in the title of her text “La notion dite confuse de l’infinite´simal
chez Leibniz” [Ishiguro 1986], an early version of her Chapter 5. As she
writes there, “This is because the concept of infinitesimal was seen as
being confused.” [Ishiguro 1990, p. 79] [emphasis added] Furthermore,
The second kind of critic acknowledges that Leibniz was
interested in foundational issues, but after examination
sees basic inconsistencies in his views. (ibid., p. 80)
[emphasis added]
Thus, Ishiguro purports to defend Leibniz’s honor as an unconfused and
consistent logician by means of her syncategorematic reading. Mean-
while, in the first edition of her book, Ishiguro wrote:
Leibniz’s philosophy of logic and language makes far
more sense in every aspect than has generally been thought,
let alone that his thought is more coherent than Russell
allowed. [Ishiguro 1972, p. 16]
We argue that such an appreciation of Leibniz applies equally well to
his infinitesimal calculus in the spirit of Bernoulli and Euler. Ishiguro
goes on to write:
In many respects, it is much less dated than the theories
of Locke and Berkeley, and even of Kant. (ibid.)
According to Ishiguro, the superiority of Leibniz’s thought over that
of Locke and Berkeley manifests itself also in Leibniz’s rejection of
empiricism.2
2Thus, Leibniz’s disagreements with empiricism are mentioned in the final para-
graph of Ishiguro’s 1972 book: “[Leibniz’s] disagreement with many of the views
of the empiricists, as with those of the Cartesians, sprang from his belief that
their theories failed to account for the complex facts which fascinated him, whether
these were about the language we have or about the concepts we use.” (ibid.,
p. 145) These comments on empiricism and Cartesianism appeared at the end of
section 6 entitled “Concepts resolvable at infinity” in the final chapter 7, entitled
“Necessity and Contingency.” Ishiguro’s section 6 “Concepts resolvable at infinity”
4 T.B., P.B., V.K., K.K., M.K., D.SC., AND D.SH.
We similarly believe that Leibniz was not confused and likewise in-
tend to defend his honor, in this case against Ishiguro’s reading. We
will see that at a few key junctures, Ishiguro is forced to defend her
reading by attributing confusion to Leibniz; see Subsections 6.1 and 6.3.
On at least one occasion, Ishiguro misrepresents what Leibniz wrote so
as to buttress her position; see Subsection 6.2. We shall argue that the
appeal to logical fictions is neither necessary to defend Leibniz’s honor,
nor warranted in view of the actual content of Leibniz’s mathematics
and philosophy.
1.2. Categorematic vs syncategorematic. According to Ishiguro,
expressions like dy/dx, which appear to refer to infinitesimals, are not
in fact referring, denoting, or categorematic, expressions. Rather, they
are syncategorematic expressions, namely expressions which disappear
when the logical content of the propositions in which they occur is
properly clarified and made explicit. Writes Ishiguro:
The word ‘infinitesimal’ does not designate a special
kind of magnitude. In fact, it does not designate3 at
all. [Ishiguro 1990, p. 83]
A few pages later, she clarifies the nature of her non-designating claim
in the following terms:
we can paraphrase the proposition with a universal propo-
sition with an embedded existential claim. (ibid., p. 87)
In conclusion,
Fictions [such as Leibnizian infinitesimals] are not enti-
ties to which we refer. . . . They are correlates of ways of
speaking which can be reduced to talk about more stan-
dard kinds of entities. (ibid., p. 100) [emphasis added]
Such fictions (which are not entities) are exemplified by Leibnizian in-
finitesimals, in Ishiguro’s view. Her contention is that, when Leibniz
is still present in the second (1990) edition, though “Necessity and contingency”
is now chapter 9 rather than 7 (this is due in part to the addition of Chapter 5
seeking to reduce infinitesimals to quantified propositions). The comment on em-
piricism and Cartesianism disappeared from the second edition, but here Ishiguro
writes that Leibniz’s reasoning “is not of an empiricist kind like that of Berkeley.”
[Ishiguro 1990, p. 85]
3Ishiguro uses designate as an intransitive verb, and similarly for the verbs denote
and refer. A term is said not to refer when the term does not actually refer to
anything but rather is awaiting a clarification of the logical content of the sentence
it occurs in, which would make the term disappear. An example is provided by
Weierstrass’s use of the term infinitesimal as discussed in Subsection 2.1.
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talked about infinitesimals, what he really meant was a certain quan-
tified proposition, or more precisely a quantifier-equipped proposition.
In short, Leibniz was talking about ordinary numbers.
For the 17th century context see [Alexander 2014]. Ishiguro does
mention “Leibniz’s followers like Johann Bernoulli, de l’Hospital, or
Euler, who were all brilliant mathematicians rather than philosophers,”
[Ishiguro 1990, pp. 79-80] but then goes on to yank Leibniz right out
of his historical context by claiming that their modus operandi
is prima facie a strange thing to ascribe to someone who,
like Leibniz, was obsessed with general methodological
issues, and with the logical analysis of all statements and
the well-foundedness of all explanations. (ibid., p. 80)
Having thus abstracted Leibniz from his late 17th century context,
Ishiguro proceeds to insert him in a late 19th century Weierstrassian
cookbook. Such an approach to a historical figure would apparently
not escape Unguru’s censure:
It is . . . a historically unforgiveable sin . . . to assume
wrongly that mathematical equivalence is tantamount
to historical equivalence. [Unguru 1976, p. 783]
Ishiguro seems to have been aware of the problem and at the end of
her Chapter 5 she tries again to explain
why I believe that Leibniz’s views on the contextual
definition of infinitesimals is [sic] different from those
of other mathematicians of his own time who sought for
operationist definitions for certain mathematical notions
[Ishiguro 1990, p. 99],
but with limited success.
2. Testing the limits of syncategorematics
We take it that ‘infinitesimal’ expressions do designate insofar as our
symbolism allows us to think about infinitesimals. It should be empha-
sized that our contention that a Leibnizian infinitesimal does designate
does not imply that they designate entities on a par with monads, ma-
terial objects, or ideal entities. While infinitesimal is a designating
expression for Leibniz, it designates a fictional entity. Likewise, for
Leibniz, imaginary quantity designates a fictional entity (see Subsec-
tion 7.5). The literature contains a considerable amount of confusion
on this subject, as in the following:
The use of fictitious quantities could lead to the erro-
neous idea of objects whose existence is assured by their
6 T.B., P.B., V.K., K.K., M.K., D.SC., AND D.SH.
very definition and therefore to ascribing a modern con-
ception to Leibniz. In reality, what finds its foundation
in Nature cannot be created by the human mind by
means of a definition. [Ferraro 2008, p. 36]
Now the matter of creating by definition is a tricky one. Leibniz cer-
tainly denies that definitions carry existential commitments. In Leib-
niz, infinitesimals are created at the syntactic level by postulation,
which has a subtle relation to existence. This must be so, since the
difficulty Ferraro perceives arises equally for real numbers. The article
[Leibniz 1695b, p. 322] introduces infinitesimals specifically by invoking
a definition, namely Euclid Def. V.4, and postulating that infinitesimals
are entities that fail to satisfy the latter.
In order to test the range of applicability of Ishiguro’s syncategore-
matic reading, we consider the following two extreme cases.
2.1. Weierstrass on infinitesimals. On the one hand, there does
exist a context where Ishiguro’s logical fiction hypothesis may be on
solid ground. On occasion, Weierstrass mentions an infinitesimal defini-
tion of continuity. This is Cauchy’s original definition of continuity (see
[Cauchy 1821, p. 34]) of a function y = f(x): infinitesimal x-increment
always produces an infinitesimal change in y. Thus, Weierstrass wrote:
Finally, once the concept of the infinitely small has been
grasped correctly, one can define the concept of the con-
tinuity of a function in the vicinity of a as follows: that
infinitely small changes in the arguments correspond to
infinitely small changes in the value of the function in
the vicinity of a.4 [Weierstrass 1886, p. 74]
It may be reasonable to conjecture that when Weierstrass refers to
an infinitesimal, he always means (unlike Leibniz, on our reading) a
kind of logical fiction. Here an infinitesimal is shorthand for a longer
paraphrase expressed by a proposition whose quantifiers range over
ordinary real numbers, namely the sort of proposition that typifies
Weierstrass’s contribution to the foundations of analysis.
On the other hand (and at the other extreme), an infinitesimal
is not meant to be a shorthand for a quantified paraphrase in the
context of modern infinitesimal frameworks such as those of Robin-
son (see [Robinson 1961]), Lawvere-Kock (see [Kock 2006]), or J. Bell
4In the original: “Endlich kann man, den Begriff des unendlich Kleinen richtig
gefaßt, den Begriff der Stetigkeit einer Funktion in der Na¨he von a auch dadurch
definieren, daß unendlich kleinen A¨nderungen der Argumente unendlich kleine
A¨nderungen des Funktionswertes in der Na¨he von a entsprechen sollen.”
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[Bell 2006]. Note that Robinson as a formalist distanced himself from
Platonist and foundationalist views: “mathematical theories which,
allegedly, deal with infinite totalities do not have any detailed . . . ref-
erence.” [Robinson 1975, p. 42]
Ishiguro’s argument is based on first philosophical principles (rather
than on historical analysis or careful textual study) that are so general
that, while it might apply to Weierstrass, it is difficult to see what
would prevent her from applying it to Robinson, as well. Yet scholars
agree that Robinson’s infinitesimals are not logical fictions; nor is his
continuum Archimedean.
2.2. Syncategorematic vs fictionalist. The syncategorematic in-
terpretation of Leibnizian infinitesimals is the starting point of much
recent Leibniz scholarship. Leading Leibniz scholar E. Knobloch writes:
To my knowledge most of the historians of mathematics
are convinced that Leibniz used an Archimedean con-
tinuum: Leibniz himself referred to the Greek authority
in order to justify his procedure. [Knobloch 2014]
Writes U. Goldenbaum:
That Leibniz as a mature mathematician and philoso-
pher did not take infinitesimals to be real entities, but
rather as finite quantities, was clarified as early as 1972
by Hide´ Ishiguru [sic]. [Goldenbaum 2008, p. 76, note 59].
[Rabouin 2015, note 25] similarly endorses Ishiguro’s Chapter 5. Both
S. Levey and [Arthur 2008, p. 20], [Arthur 2013, p. 554] take Ishiguro’s
interpretation as settled and have concentrated, instead, on demon-
strating that Leibniz embraced the syncategorematic interpretation of
infinitesimals as early as 1676. The following, from Levey, is typical:
[B]y April of 1676, with his early masterwork on the
calculus, De Quadratura Arithmetica, nearly complete,
Leibniz has abandoned an ontology of actual infinites-
imals and adopted the syncategorematic view of both
the infinite and the infinitely small as a philosophy of
mathematics and, correspondingly, he has arrived at the
official view of infinitesimals as fictions in his calculus.
[Levey 2008, p. 133] [emphasis added]
O. Nachtomy chimes in:
. . . Richard Arthur makes a very convincing argument
that Leibniz’s syncategorematic view of infinitesimals
was developed in the very early 1670s and matured in
1676. [Nachtomy 2009]
8 T.B., P.B., V.K., K.K., M.K., D.SC., AND D.SH.
We don’t intend to disagree with Levey and others that Leibniz may
have “abandoned an ontology of actual infinitesimals” early on. How-
ever, we object to the conflation of the views of the syncategorematicist
and the fictionalist. The syncategorematic interpretation is a fictional-
ist interpretation, to be sure, but the converse is not the case.
In what follows we shall demonstrate that Leibniz understood this
point and had good reason to embrace a different variety of fictionalism,
which we call pure fictionalism.5 Modern exponents of this variety of
fictionalism include Hilbert and Robinson (see [Katz & Sherry 2013]).
That Leibniz considered an alternative version of fictionalism will
come as a surprise mainly to scholars whose outlook presumes that
the epsilon-delta style of analysis, promoted by the “triumvirate” of
Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass (see [Boyer 1949, p. 298]) is the
embodiment of inevitable progress climaxing in the establishment of the
foundations of real analysis purged of infinitesimals; related issues are
explored in articles [Katz & Kutateladze 2015], [Kanovei et al. 2015a],
[Kanovei, Katz & Sherry 2015].
2.3. Summary of Ishiguro’s hypothesis. According to Ishiguro,
Leibniz’s conception of continuity (i.e., the continuum) is Archimedean.
On the syncategorematic reading, talk about infinitesimals involves
only expressions which do not denote anything. The position as ex-
pressed in [Ishiguro 1990, Chapter 5] can therefore be summarized in
terms of the following three contentions.
(1) Taking Leibnizian infinitesimals at face value requires one to
see Leibniz as confused (ibid., p. 79) and/or inconsistent (ibid.,
p. 80);
(2) A term that seems to express a Leibnizian infinitesimal does
not actually designate, denote, or refer, and is a logical fiction;
(3) Leibniz’s continuum is Archimedean.
None of these can be sustained in light of Leibniz’s philosophical and
mathematical texts.
5Perhaps we may be allowed to quote Leibniz’s own description of his method: My
arithmetic of infinites is pure, Wallis’ is figurate (“Arithmetica infinitorum mea est
pura, Wallisii figurata” [Leibniz 1672, p. 102]), as translated in [Beeley 2008, p. 46].
Note that the text in question, De progressionibus et de arithmetica infinitorum,
predates the Arithmetic Quadrature. What Leibniz meant by figurata is not entirely
clear, nor does the context offer an indication. The most likely interpretation seems
to be that Wallis relied on induction from geometric figures, which Leibniz’ method
did not require.
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3. Analysis of Ishiguro’s contentions
Let us analyze Ishiguro’s hypothesis as summarized in Subsection 2.3.
Ishiguro’s contention (1) concerns scholars like C. Boyer and J. Earman
(see [Ishiguro 1990, p. 80]). However, a perusal of their work reveals
that the ultimate source of the inconsistency claim is Berkeley’s de-
parted quantities. Thus, Ishiguro’s contention (1) echoes Berkeley’s
claim that inconsistent properties have been attributed to dx, viz.,
(dx 6= 0) ∧ (dx = 0).6
However, Berkeley’s claim ignores Leibniz’s generalized relation of equal-
ity (see Subsection 3.2).
3.1. Of dx and (d)x. Ishiguro does not appear to be an attentive
reader of H. Bos, and in fact on page 81 she misrepresents his position.
She quotes Bos to the effect that Leibniz eventually introduced the
finite (assignable) differentials. For these he used the notation (d)x in
place of dx. These satisfy the equality on the nose
(d)y = L (d)x,
where L is what we would call today the derivative. Bos does say that.
However, Ishiguro further implies that, according to Bos, these (d)x’s
completely replaced the earlier dx’s. She then goes on to disagree with
her strawman Bos by claiming that Leibniz never changed his mind
about infinitesimals (namely that they were always logical fictions).
On p. 81 Ishiguro writes: “Bos talks (perhaps naturally as a post-
Robinsonian) as if it is quite clear what it means for a magnitude
to be infinitely small, and that Leibniz first assumed the existence of
such things.” Bos may well be surprised to find himself described as
a post-Robinsonian, especially given what he wrote about Robinson in
[Bos 1974, Appendix 2]; see further in Subsection 3.3.
Contrary to Ishiguro, Bos never asserted that the dx’s disappeared
with the introduction of (d)x’s. Bos merely reports that Leibniz intro-
duced the additional concepts (d)x, not that they completely replaced
the dx’s, which they certainly never did. Thus, the late piece Cum
Prodiisset [Leibniz 1701c] features both the (d)x’s and the dx’s, as
well as the crucial distinction between assignable and inassignable:
6Berkeley’s critique was dissected into its logical and metaphysical components in
[Sherry 1987]. The logical criticism concerns the alleged inconsistency expressed
by the conjunction (dx 6= 0) ∧ (dx = 0), while the metaphysical criticism is fueled
by Berkeley’s empiricist doubts about entities that are below any finite perceptual
threshold; see Subsection 1.1 and note 2.
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. . . although we may be content with the assignable quan-
tities (d)y, (d)v, (d)z, (d)x, etc., . . . yet it is plain
from what I have said that, at least in our minds, the
unassignables [inassignables in the original Latin] dx
and dy may be substituted for them by a method of
supposition even in the case when they are evanescent;
. . . (as translated in [Child 1920, p. 153]).
3.2. Law of homogeneity. Bos notes that Leibniz already mentioned
his law of homogeneity in Nova Methodus [Leibniz 1684]. Leibniz ex-
plained the law in a letter to Wallis [Leibniz 1699, p. 63], and gave the
most detailed presentation in his 1710 piece [Leibniz 1710b] mention-
ing the transcendental law of homogeneity (TLH) in the title. The law
involves, roughly, discarding higher-order terms.
Leibniz was using the relation of equality in a generalized sense of
equality up to, as mentioned in his Responsio (see e.g., Subsection 6.2
below, sentences labeled [1] and [2]). This means that dx does not turn
out to be zero at the end of the calculation but, rather, is discarded
in an application of TLH. Equality up to undermines the claim of log-
ical inconsistency (alleged by Berkeley) without a need to dip into a
Weierstrassian cookbook with hidden quantifiers a` la Frege.
An antecedent to the Leibnizian generalized equality is found in Fer-
mat’s relation of adequality ; see [Bair et al. 2013], [Bascelli et al. 2014],
[Cifoletti 1990], [Katz, Schaps & Shnider 2013]. Leibniz in fact men-
tions Fermat’s method in the context of a discussion of the generalized
notion of equality. Here Leibniz is objecting to Nieuwentijt’s postula-
tion that the square of an infinitesimal term should be exactly nothing:
Quod autem in aequationibus Fermatianis abjiciuntur
termini, quos ingrediuntur talia quadrata vel rectangula,
non vero illi quos ingrediuntur simplices lineae infinites-
imae, ejus ratio non est, quod hae sint aliquid, illae vero
sint nibil, sed quod termini ordinarii per se destruun-
tur, hinc restant tum termini, quos ingrediuntur Iineae
simplices infinite parvae, tum quos ingrediuntur harum
quadrata vel rectangula: cum vero hi termini sint illis
incomparabiliter minores, abjiciuntur. Quod si termini
ordinarii non evanuissent, etiam termini infinitesimarum
linearum non minus, quam ab his quadratorum abjici
debuissent. [Leibniz 1695b, p. 323]
We translate this as follows:
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But the reason that in Fermat’s equations, terms incor-
porating squares or similar products are discarded, but
not those containing simple infinitesimal lines [i.e., seg-
ments], is not that the latter are something, whereas the
former are, on the contrary, nothing; but rather that the
ordinary terms cancel each other out, whence there then
remain terms containing infinitely small simple lines,
and also those containing their squares or products: but
since the latter terms are incomparably smaller than
the former, they are discarded. Because if the ordinary
terms did not disappear, then the terms of the infinites-
imal lines would have to be discarded no less than their
squares or products.7
Here Leibniz describes Fermat’s method in a way similar to Leibniz’s
own.
Ishiguro’s contention (2) is based on the fictional status of Leibnizian
infinitesimals. To be sure, Leibniz frequently describes his infinitesi-
mals as “useful fictions.” However, their fictional nature could merely
mean to Leibniz that they lack reference to either a material object or
an ideal entity, as Leibniz often writes, not necessarily that they are
logical fictions as Ishiguro claims.
Ishiguro’s contentions (2) and (3) amount to a claim of proto-Weier-
strassian hidden quantifier ranging over ordinary Archimedean quanti-
ties. One of the passages claimed to support such a reading of Leibniz
is a letter to Pinson dated 29 august 1701, where Leibniz writes:
[I]n lieu of the infinite or infinitely small, we take quan-
tities as great or as small as it is required so that the
error would be less than the given error such that we
do not differ from the style of Archimedes except in the
expressions [....] (as translated in [Tho 2012, p. 71])
(we have retained Tho’s precise punctuation which turns out to be
significant; see below). This passage is an optimistic expression of, in
Jesseph’s phrase, a grand programmatic statement ; see Section 4. We
will analyze this passage further in Section 5.
3.3. Ishiguro, Bos, Robinson. Given Ishiguro’s post-Robinsonian
description of Bos (see Subsection 3.1), it will prove instructive to ex-
amine the matter in more detail. On the one hand, Robinson famously
argued for continuity between the Leibnizian framework and his own.
On the other, Bos rejected such claims of continuity in his Appendix 2:
7A French translation is in [Leibniz 1989, p. 329].
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. . . the most essential part of non-standard analysis,
namely the proof of the existence of the entities it deals
with, was entirely absent in the Leibnizian infinitesimal
analysis, and this constitutes, in my view, so fundamen-
tal a difference between the theories that the Leibnizian
analysis cannot be called an early form, or a precursor,
of non-standard analysis [Bos 1974, p. 83].
Bos’s comment is not sufficiently sensitive to the dichotomy of prac-
tice (or procedures) versus ontology (or foundational account for the
entities such as numbers). While it is true that Leibniz’s calculus con-
tains nothing like a set-theoretical existence proof, nonetheless there do
exist Leibnizian procedures exploiting infinitesimals that find suitable
proxies in the procedures in the hyperreal framework. In other words,
there are close formal analogies between inference procedures in the
Leibnizian calculus and the Robinsonian calculus. See [Reeder 2013]
for a related discussion in the context of Euler. The relevance of such
hyperreal proxies is in no way diminished by the fact that set-theoretic
foundations of the latter (“proof of the existence of the entities,” as
Bos put it) were obviously as unavailable in the 17th century as set-
theoretic foundations of the real numbers.
In the context of his discussion of “present-day standards of mathe-
matical rigor”, Bos writes:
it is understandable that for mathematicians who be-
lieve that these present-day standards are final, nonstan-
dard analysis answers positively the question whether,
after all, Leibniz was right [Bos 1974, p. 82, item 7.3].
[emphasis added]
The context of the discussion makes it clear that Bos’s criticism targets
Robinson. If so, Bos’s criticism suffers from a strawman fallacy, for
Robinson specifically wrote that he did not consider set theory to be the
foundation of mathematics, and being a formalist, he did not subscribe
to the view attributed to him by Bos that “present-day standards are
final.” Robinson expressed his position on the status of set theory as
follows:
an infinitary framework such as set theory . . . cannot
be regarded as the ultimate foundation for mathematics
[Robinson 1969, p. 45]; see also [Robinson 1966, p. 281].
Furthermore, contrary to Bos’s claim, Robinson’s goal was not to show
that “Leibniz was right” as Bos claimed. Rather, Robinson sought
to provide hyperreal proxies for the inferential procedures commonly
found in Leibniz as well as Euler and Cauchy; for the latter see e.g.,
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[Borovik & Katz 2012]. Leibniz’s procedures, involving as they do in-
finitesimals and infinite numbers, seem far less puzzling in light of their
B-track hyperreal proxies than from the viewpoint of the received A-
track frameworks; see Section 4.
Some decades later, Bos has distanced himself from his Appendix 2
in the following terms (in response to a question from one of the authors
of the present text):
An interesting question, what made me reject a claim
some 35 years ago? I reread the appendix [i.e., Appen-
dix 2] and was surprised about the self assurance of my
younger self. I’m less definite in my opinions today - or
so I think. [Bos 2010]
And he continues:
You’re right that the appendix was not sympathetic to
Robinson’s view. Am I now more sympathetic? If you
talk about “historical continuity” I have little problem
to agree with you, given the fact that one can interpret
continuity in historical devlopments in many ways; even
revolutions can come to be seen as continuous develop-
ments. (ibid.)
While Bos acknowledges that his Appendix 2 was “unsympathetic to
Robinson’s view” we must also point out that his opinions as ex-
presssed in Appendix 2 were based on mathematical misunderstandings
(particularly in connection with the transfer principle, as discussed in
[Katz & Sherry 2013, Section 11.3]), marring an otherwise excellent
study of Leibnizian methodology [Bos 1974], to which we now turn.
4. Grand programmatic statements
In his seminal study, Bos argued that Leibniz exploited two compet-
ing methods in his work, one Archimedean and the other involving the
law of continuity and infinitesimals (see e.g., [Bos 1974, p. 57]).
In asserting that Leibniz exploited distinct methods in developing
the calculus, we mean that he employed distinct conceptualisations of
continua; i.e., Leibniz employed different techniques for representing
relations among continuously changing magnitudes. At a minimum,
the techniques differed in the inferences they sanctioned and in the
objects, whether ideal or fictional, which individual symbols in the
technique purported to represent.
Such a dichotomy can be reformulated in the terminology of dual
methodology (see [Katz & Sherry 2013]) as follows. One finds both
A-track (i.e., Archimedean) and B-track (Bernoullian, i.e., involving
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infinitesimals)8 methodologies in Leibniz. In addition, Leibniz on oc-
casion speculates as to how one might seek to reformulate B-track tech-
niques in an A-track fashion.
Now there is no argument that such a pair distinct methodologies,
A and B, is present in Leibniz at the syntactic level. Ishiguro does not
disagree with the apparent surface difference between them. What she
argues, however, is that the syntactic difference is merely skin-deep, so
that once one clarifies the precise content of the sentences one arrives
at the conclusion that at that deeper level, talk about infinitesimals
(B-track) is merely shorthand for a quantified statement (A-track), a
position we denote
B = A
as shorthand for Ishiguro’s contention that Leibnizian infinitesimals are
logical fictions.
We argue that the syntactic difference in fact corresponds to a se-
mantic difference. Each methodology has its respective ontology. The
B method involves a richer numerical structure than the A method.
Note that the structures have different ontological status. The B nu-
merical structure involves pure fictions, while the A structure involves
ideal entities. On this view, the A and B methods are truly distinct,
i.e., the Leibnizian infinitesimals are pure fictions, even though Leib-
niz occasionally argues that B should be paraphrasable in terms of A,
given enough effort. This hopefully paraphrasable view can be denoted
by the formula
B > A,
suggesting that what is involved in the B-method is an extended num-
ber system including infinitesimals a` la rigueur (as Leibniz put it with
respect to “des infinis” in [Leibniz 1702a, p. 92]), namely what we re-
fer to as a Bernoullian continuum. D. Jesseph expressed this aspect of
Leibniz’s position in the following terms:
Leibniz often makes grand programmatic statements to
the effect that derivations which presuppose infinitesi-
mals can always be re-cast as exhaustion proofs in the
style of Archimedes. But Leibniz never, so far as I
8 Scholars attribute the first systematic use of infinitesimals as a foundational
concept to Johann Bernoulli. While Leibniz exploited both infinitesimal methods
and “exhaustion” methods (usually interpreted in the context of an Archimedean
continuum, but see footnote 10), Bernoulli never wavered from the infinitesimal
methodology. To note the fact of such systematic use by Bernoulli is not to say
that Bernoulli’s foundation is adequate, or that that it could distinguish between
manipulations with infinitesimals that produce only true results and those manip-
ulations that can yield false results.
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know, attempted anything like a general proof of the
eliminability of the infinitesimal, or offered anything
approaching a universal scheme for re-writing the pro-
cedures of the calculus in terms of exhaustion proofs.
[Jesseph 2008, p. 233]. [emphasis added]
The most basic difference between the positions represented respec-
tively by B = A and B > A is that the former implies that the
background continuum of both the A-method and the B-method is
Archimedean, whereas the latter recognizes a genuinely enriched (Ber-
noullian) continuum in the B-method.
We grant that for any given Leibnizian passage discussing the rela-
tion between A-method and B-method, a plausible case can be made
for either B = A or B > A, given sufficient ingenuity. How can a
scholar determine which interpretation is truer to Leibniz’s intentions?
In the next few sections we present context-specific clues in Leibniz
that would allow one to choose between the two interpretations.
5. Truncation manipulations
Returning to the passage from the letter to Pinson quoted in Sec-
tion 3, one discovers that Tho truncated the passage to make it fit
Ishiguro’s analysis of Leibnizian infinitesimals. The full passage doesn’t
fit so well:
Car au lieu de l’infini ou de l’infiniment petit, on prend
des quantite´s aussi grandes et aussi petites qu’il faut
pour que l’erreur soit moindre que l’erreur donne´e, de
sorte que l’on ne differe du style d’Archimede que dans
les expressions qui sont plus directes dans Nostre meth-
ode, et plus conforme a` l’art d’inventer.9 [Leibniz 1701a,
p. 96]
The conclusion of the passage, namely the clause concerning the ex-
pressions
qui sont plus directes dans Nostre methode, et plus con-
forme a` l’art d’inventer
was omitted from Tho’s translation cited in Section 3. This conclusion
clearly indicates that Leibniz’s (B-track) method, where the expressions
9We have retained Leibniz’s spelling which differs slightly from modern French
spelling. We provide an English translation as found in [Jesseph 2008, note 25,
p. 229]: “For in place of the infinite or the infinitely small we can take quantities as
great or as small as is necessary in order that the error will be less than any given
error. In this way we only differ from the style of Archimedes in the expressions,
which are more direct in our method and better adapted to the art of discovery.”
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are plus directes, is distinct from the (A-track) moindre que l’erreur
donne´e paraphrase thereof. Leibniz’s expression plus directes suggests
a distinct method rather than merely a shorthand. Thus Leibniz is
following a distinct strategy, that employs an enriched continuum.10
The specific clues contained in this particular passage from Leibniz
favor the B > A reading over the B = A reading (see Section 4).
6. Incomparables
Let us examine Ishiguro’s interpretation of Leibniz’s notion of the
incomparably small.
6.1. Misleading and unfortunate. Ishiguro claims that “the incom-
parable magnitude is not an infinitesimal magnitude” [Ishiguro 1990,
p. 87], and continues:
It is misleading for Leibniz to call these magnitudes in-
comparably small. What his explanation gives us is
rather that a certain truth about the existence of com-
parably smaller magnitudes gives rise to the notion of in-
comparable magnitudes, not incomparably smaller mag-
nitudes. If magnitudes are incomparable, they can be
neither bigger nor smaller. [Ishiguro 1990, p. 87–88]
She reiterates this claim in another sentence, regretting Leibniz’s choice
of unfortunate terminology:
As we have already mentioned, the unfortunate thing
about Leibniz’s vocabulary here is that he moves from
incomparable to incomparably small or incomparably
smaller (incomparabilitier parva or incomparabilitier mi-
nor), when smaller is already a notion involving com-
parison. (ibid., p. 88)
For all her professed good intentions of defending Leibniz’s honor (see
Section 1), Ishiguro ends up being forced to defend her interpretation by
tarnishing that honor. She reproaches him for employing purportedly
10In the context of Leibniz’s reference to Archimedes, it should be noted that there
are other possible interpretations of the exhaustion method of Archimedes. The
received interpretation, developed in [Dijksterhuis 1987], is in terms of the limit
concept of real analysis. However, in the 17th century, [Wallis 1685, pp. 280-290]
developed a different interpretation in terms of approximation by infinite-sided
polygons. The ancient exhaustion method has two components: (1) geometric
construction, consisting of approximation by some simple figure, e.g., a polygon or
a line build of segments, (2) justification carried out in the theory of proportion
developed in Elements Book V. In the 17th century, mathematicians adopted the
first component, and developed alternative justifications.
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misleading and unfortunate terminology in the context of incompara-
bles. In fact, Leibniz’s terminology for incomparables appears felicitous
when the latter are interpreted as pure rather than logical fictions.
Ishiguro appears to claim that talk about incomparability excludes
the relation of being smaller. Note, however, that the term incompa-
rable can be used in two distinct senses:
(1) it can refer to things that cannot be compared because they are
of different nature, e.g., a line and a surface;
(2) it can refer to things of the same nature but not comparable be-
cause they are of different order of magnitude, e.g., an ordinary
nonzero real number and an infinitesimal.
Ishiguro seems to assume the meaning (1) without any historical evi-
dence. Seeking the meaning of incomparability she speculates further:
The fact that we cannot add or subtract the quantities
in question to make one quantity constitutes, it seems,
the very criterion of their nonhomogeneity and hence of
their incomparability. (ibid., p. 88)
Thus, on Ishiguro’s reading, x is incomparably smaller than y means
that x and y are not comparable at all, while their incomparability
means that x cannot be added to y.
6.2. Evidence fromResponsio. To buttress her interpretation Ishig-
uro cites a few passages from Leibniz. The case of the 1695 Responsio
to Nieuwentijt is particularly instructive here. Ishiguro writes:
Leibniz, in the reply to Nieuwentijt of 1695 cited earlier,
also asserts that the magnitude of a line and a point of
another line cannot be added, nor can a line be added to
a surface, and he says that they are incomparable since
only homogeneous quantities are comparable. (Leibniz
writes that all homogeneous quantities are comparable
in the Archimedean sense.) (ibid., p. 88)
However, in the very same Responsio we find a rather different account
of incomparability from Ishiguro’s. Leibniz writes as follows:
[1] Caeterum aequalia esse puto, non tantum quorum
differentia est omnino nulla, sed et quorum differentia
est incomparabiliter parva; [2] et licet ea Nihil omnino
dici non debeat, non tamen est quantitas comparabilis
cum ipsis, quorum est differentia. [3] Quemadmodum si
lineae punctum alterius lineae addas, vel superficiei lin-
eam, quantitatem non auges. [4] Idem est, si lineam qui-
dem lineae addas, sed incomparabiliter minorem. [5] Nec
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ulla constructione tale augmentum exhiberi potest. [6]
Scilicet eas tantum homogeneas quantitates compara-
biles esse, cum Euclide lib. 5 defin. 5 censeo, quarum
una numero, sed finito11 multiplicata, alteram superare
potest. [7] Et quae tali quantitate non differunt, ae-
qualia esse statuo, quod etiam Archimedes sumsit, ali-
ique post ipsum omnes.[Leibniz 1695b, p. 322] (numer-
als [1] through [7] added)
We translate this passage as follows:
[1] Furthermore I think that not only those things are equal whose
difference is absolutely zero, but also whose difference is incom-
parably small.
[2] And although this [difference] need not absolutely be called
Nothing, neither is it a quantity comparable to those whose
difference it is.
[3] It is so when you add a point of a line to another line or a line
to a surface, then you do not increase the quantity.
[4] The same is when you add to a line a certain line that is
incomparably smaller.
[5] Such a construction entails no increase.
[6] Now I think, in accordance with Euclid Book V def. 5, that
only those homogeneous quantities one of which, being multi-
plied by a finite number, can exceed the other, are comparable.
[7] And those that do not differ by such a quantity are equal,
which was accepted by Archimedes and his followers.
Here Leibniz employs the term line in the sense of what we would
today call a segment. In sentence [3], Leibniz exploits the classical
example with indivisibles (adding a point to a line doesn’t change its
length) so as to motivate a similar phenomenon for infinitesimals in
sentence [4] (adding an infinitesimal line to a finite line does not increase
its quantity), namely his law of homogeneity (TLH) explained in more
detail elsewhere (see Section 3).
In sentence [6], Leibniz refers to quantities satisfying Euclid V.5, i.e.,
the Archimedean axiom. In a follow-up sentence [7], Leibniz goes on
11When Leibniz mentions a number he is paraphrasing Euclid’s definition. Now
Euclid doesn’t mention that he is speaking of the line being added to itself finitely
many times. But this point is essential for Leibniz, as it isn’t obvious that an
infinitesimal added to itself infinitely many times might not get to be larger than
a given finite magnitude. Therefore Leibniz inserts the term that Euclid doesn’t
use, and writes sed finito, literally “of course finite.” Note that there is no number
in Euclid’s V.4, but rather a multitude. Thus, Leibniz reads Euclid’s multitude as
number, and to be precise modifies it by finite.
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to refer to ‘those [quantities],’ say Q and Q′, that ‘do not differ by
such a quantity,’ namely they do not differ by a quantity of the type
mentioned in sentence [6] (and satisfying Euclid V.5 with respect to Q
or Q′). Rather, Q and Q′ differ by a quantity not satisfying Euclid V.5.
Leibniz referred to such quantities in sentence [1] as incomparably small.
Thus Leibniz is quite explicit about the fact that he is dealing with an
incomparably small difference Q−Q′ which violates the Archimedean
axiom V.5 when compared to either Q or Q′. Leibniz is even more
explicit about the fact that his incomparables violate Euclid V.5 (when
compared to other quantities) in his letter to l’Hospital from the same
year:
J’appelle grandeurs incomparables dont l’une multiplie´e
par quelque nombre fini que ce soit, ne sc¸auroit exceder
l’autre, de la meˆme facon qu’Euclide la pris dans sa cin-
quieme definition du cinquieme livre. [Leibniz 1695a,
p. 288]
The claim in [Arthur 2013, p. 562] based on this very passage from Re-
sponsio that allegedly “Leibniz was quite explicit about this Archimedean
foundation for his differentials as ‘incomparables’ ” is therefore surpris-
ing. The 1695 letter to l’Hospital does not appear in Arthur’s bibliog-
raphy.
Referring to the passage we quoted, Ishiguro claims that “Leibniz,
in the reply to Nieuwentijt . . . asserts that the magnitude of a line and
a point of another line cannot be added, nor can a line be added to a
surface, . . . ” [Ishiguro 1990, p. 88]. On the contrary, Leibniz wrote in
sentence [3] that they can indeed be so added, though the addition of
a point to a line does not increase the line. Thus addition is possible
according to Leibniz, contrary to what Ishiguro claims Leibniz asserts.
It’s just that according to Leibniz such addition does not result in
an increase. What Leibniz actually wrote undermines Ishiguro’s claim
about incomparables, rather than supporting it.
Leibniz goes on to give a parallel example with infinitesimals in sen-
tence [4]. Here addition is again possible, whereas its result is un-
changed in accordance with TLH (see Section 3).
Ishiguro somehow fails to mention the fact that Leibniz goes on to
give an example with infinitesimals. This is not merely an instance of
truncation (see Section 5). Rather, it constitutes a misrepresentation
of Leibniz’s position.
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6.3. Indivisibles, infinitesimals, and dimension. Leibniz clearly
understood the difference between infinitesimals (of the same dimen-
sion as the quantities they modify) and indivisibles (of positive codi-
mension), contrary to Ishiguro’s suggestion that
[t]he homogeneity of quantities in Leibniz . . . seems not
to depend on a prior notion of a common dimension as
in earlier mathematicians, since Leibniz wanted to free
mathematics from geometrical intuitions. [Ishiguro 1990,
p. 88]
The notion of “common dimension” is what distinguishes infinitesimals
from indivisibles. Ishiguro’s suggestion that Leibniz did not distinguish
between indivisibles and infinitesimals by means of the notion of com-
mon dimension does no honor to Leibniz; see Section 1.
The passage in [Leibniz 1695b, p. 322] cited above clearly indicates
what Leibniz means by comparable quantities. Namely, x and y are
comparable when the following condition is satisfied:
(∃n ∈ N)(nx > y),
i.e. x, y do obey Euclid’s definition V.412 as cited in Leibniz’s sen-
tence [6]. Leibniz defines an incomparably small in terms of a violation
of V.4. Thus, even though Leibniz eschews geometrical intuition, he is
still able to distinguish indivisibles from infinitesimals.
6.4. Theory of magnitudes. Since Leibniz explicitly refers to Eu-
clid’s definition V.4 in the Responsio (see Subsection 6.2, sentence [6]),
let us turn to the theory of magnitudes as developed in Book V of the
Elements. Euclid’s magnitudes of the same kind (homogeneous quanti-
ties in Leibniz’s terminology) can be formalized as an ordered additive
semigroup with a total order, M = (M,+, <), characterized by the five
axioms given below.
[Beckmann 1967/1968] and [B laszczyk & Mro´wka 2013, pp. 101-122]
provide detailed sources for the axioms below in the primary source
(Euclid). See also [Mueller 1981, pp. 118-148] which mostly follows
Beckmann’s development. Axiom E1 below interprets Euclid V.4:
E1 (∀x, y ∈M)(∃n ∈ N)(nx > y),
E2 (∀x, y ∈M)(∃z ∈M)(x < y ⇒ x+ z = y),
E3 (∀x, y, z ∈M)(x < y ⇒ x+ z < y + z),
12Leibniz lists number V.5 for Euclid’s definition instead of V.4. In some editions of
the Elements this definition does appear as V.5. Thus, [Euclid 1660] as translated
by Barrow in 1660 provides the following definition in V.V (the notation “V.V” is
from Barrow’s translation): Those numbers are said to have a ratio betwixt them,
which being multiplied may exceed one the other.
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E4 (∀x ∈M)(∀n ∈ N)(∃y ∈M)(x = ny),
E5 (∀x, y, z ∈M)(∃v ∈M)(x : y :: z : v).
Comparable quantities can both be added to one another, and they are
also subject to the relations greater than and less than. It follows from
these axioms that for any x, y ∈ M the following inequality holds:
y < y + x.
In the realm of incomparable quantities this inequality does not hold,
even though incomparables can be added. Leibniz’s claim can be for-
malized as the relation y 6< y + x characterizing incomparable quanti-
ties.
6.5. Elements Book VI on horn angles. We turn next to Ishiguro’s
claim that incomparable quantities cannot be compared at all by means
of the relations greater than or less than.
In Book VI of the Elements one finds that line segments form a semi-
group of magnitudes of the same kind, M1, triangles form another,M2,
rectilinear angles form yet another, M3;
13 there are other kinds of mag-
nitudes in addition to the ones just mentioned. Euclid deals with two
kinds of angles in the Elements : the first kind consists of rectilinear
angles, while the second kind consists of angles cut out/formed by a
line and an arc of a circle.14 These two kinds of angles are compared
in proposition III.16. Its thesis reads as follows:
A (straight-line) drawn at right-angles to the diameter
of a circle, from its end, will fall outside the circle. And
another straight-line cannot be inserted into the space
between the (aforementioned) straight-line and the cir-
cumference. And the angle of the semi-circle is greater
than any acute rectilinear angle whatsoever, and the re-
maining (angle is) less (than any acute rectilinear angle).
(translation by Fitzpatrick in [Euclid 2007])
We present below the accompanying diagram.
13See e.g., [Euclid 2007], VI.1, 2, 33.
14In the 17th century such angles were called horn angles.
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Here “the remaining” angle, that is the one formed by the arc CA
and the tangent line EA, does not belong to the kind (i.e., species)
of rectilinear angles M3. Euclid proves it to be less than any acute
rectilinear angle.15
From the point of view of Greek mathematics, one can construct
incomparable quantities x, y, meaning that they are not of the same
kind and do not obey the Archimedean axiom, while at the same time
the relation x < y obtains. Here “x is incomparably smaller than y”
means x is smaller than y and x, y are incomparable, which can be
formalized as follows:
x < y and y 6< y + x.
Thus, incomparable quantities can be compared by inequalities both
according to Euclid and according to Leibniz.
7. Textual evidence
In this section we will examine the textual evidence Ishiguro presents
to support her claim that infinitesimals are logical fictions.
7.1. Letter to Varignon. Ishiguro’s first piece of textual evidence in
favor of her logical fiction hypothesis is a letter to Varignon dated 2 feb-
ruary 1702 [Leibniz 1702a]. Ishiguro (p. 82) does not provide a direct
quotation but refers to [Gerhardt 1850-1863], vol. IV, p. 93, which con-
tains what seems to be one of two occurrences in Leibniz of the term
“syncategorematic infinite”.16
The 2 february 1702 letter exploits the term syncategorematic. How-
ever, it is not obvious that Leibniz uses it in the same technical sense as
15It is worth noting that there are angles cut out by a line and a curve in Leibniz
papers and the phrase ‘infinitely small angle’ occurs many times; see for example
[Child 1920].
16The other one is in Leibniz’s correspondence with des Bosses: Gerhardt (ed.),
Leibniz, Philosophische Schriften vol. II, pp. 314f.: Datur infinitum syncategore-
maticum etc.
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Ishiguro. Leibniz discusses a number of examples including imaginary
numbers, dimensions beyond 3, and exponents which are not ordinary
numbers, and then comments as follows:
Cependant il ne faut pas s’imaginer que la science de
l’infini est degrade´e par cette explication et reduite a`
des fictions; car il reste tousjours un infini syncategore-
matique, comme parle l’ecole, . . . [Leibniz 1702a, p. 93].
[emphasis added]
Leibniz then goes on to discuss the summation of a geometric series and
points out that no infinitesimals need appear here. He is discussing a
way of accounting for B-methodology in terms of A-methodology. The
plain meaning of the text, as mentioned in Section 1, is that there is a
pair of distinct methodologies, and if the fictions of the B method were
found lacking, one could, at least in principle (recall Jesseph’s remark
concerning grand programmatic statements), fall back on an A-type
syncategorematic paraphrase.
In analyzing this occurrence of the adjective syncategorematic, we
again have the problem of investigating which of the two interpreta-
tions, B = A or B > A, is more faithful to Leibniz’s general philosoph-
ical outlook (see Section 4). We will therefore look for additional clues
in the letter that may favor one of the interpretations.
It is significant that the letter also contains a discussion of the law
of continuity. Here Leibniz writes that the rules of the finite succeed
in the infinite, and vice versa:
. . . il se trouve que les re`gles du fini re´ussissent dans
l’infini comme s’il y avait des atomes (c’est a` dire des
e´le´ments assignables de la nature) quoiqu’il n’y en ait
point la matie`re e´tant actuellement sousdivise´e sans fin;
et que vice versa les re`gles de l’infini re´ussissent dans le
fini, comme s’il y’avait des infiniment petits me´taphy-
siques, quoiqu’on n’en n’ait point besoin; [Leibniz 1702a,
p. 93-94] [emphasis added]
Leibniz goes on to mention the souverain principe:
et que la division de la matie`re ne parvienne jamais a`
des parcelles infiniment petites: c’est parce que tout se
gouverne par raison, et qu’autrement il n’aurait point
de science ni re`gle, ce qui ne serait point conforme avec
la nature du souverain principe [Leibniz 1702a, p. 94].
[emphasis added]
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A number of scholars, including [Knobloch 2002, p. 67] as well as
[Laugwitz 1992, p. 145], identify the passage on p. 93-94 as an alter-
native formulation of the law of continuity, viz., the rules of the finite
succeed in the infinite, and conversely. Thus, recent scholarship has
interpreted this passage as Leibniz’s endorsement of the possibility of
transfering properties from finite numbers to infinite (and infinitesi-
mal) numbers and vice versa. For example, the usual rules governing
the arithmetic operations and elementary functions should be obeyed
by infinitesimals, as well.
Now if infinitesimal expressions were merely shorthand for talk about
ordinary finite numbers or a sequence thereof, Leibniz’s law of conti-
nuity would amount to the assertion that
each element in a sequence of ordinary numbers obeys
the same rules as ordinary numbers.
But this seems anticlimactic, and moreover too tautological to have
been termed a law or a souverain principe by Leibniz. Leibniz writes
further:
Et c’est pour cet effect que j’ay donne´ un jour des lemmes
des incomparables dans les Actes de Leipzic, qu’on peut
entendre comme on vent [sic], soit des infinis a` la rigueur,
soit des grandeurs seulement, qui n’entrent point en
ligne de compte les unes au prix des autres. [Leibniz 1702a,
p. 92]. [emphasis added]
Leibniz’s pair of “soit”s in this remark indicates that there is a pair
of distict methodologies involved, as we elaborated in Section 4. Note
that Ishiguro quotes both a passage on page 91 preceding this remark
[Ishiguro 1990, p. 86], and a passage on page 92 following the remark
[Ishiguro 1990, p. 87], but fails to quote this crucial remark itself (see
our Section 5 on truncation manipulations).
Thus, the letter offers support for the thesis that Leibniz thought
infinitesimals (and infinite numbers) could stand on their own (a` la
rigueur), without paraphrase in terms of finite quantities. The letter
fits well with the B > A idea that on occasion Leibniz tried to argue
optimistically (see Section 4 on grand programmatic statements) that
B-track techniques should be paraphrasable in terms of A-track ones.
7.2. Theodicy . Ishiguro’s second piece of textual evidence is from
Leibniz’s Theodicy :
“every number is finite and assignable, every line is also
finite and assignable. Infinites and infinitely small only
signify magnitudes which one can take as big or as small
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as one wishes, in order to show that the error is smaller
than the one that has been assigned” (Theodicy, §70).
[Ishiguro 1990, p. 83].
We have retained Ishiguro’s precise punctuation including the quota-
tion marks. Note that her quotation marks close the citation without
any punctuation mark at the end of the citation. There is no indica-
tion in Ishiguro that Leibniz’s sentence does not end there, but rather
continues. It is instructive to examine Leibniz’s sentence in full:
Every number is finite and specific; every line is so like-
wise, and the infinite or infinitely small signify only
magnitudes that one may take as great or as small as
one wishes, to show that an error is smaller than that
which has been specified, that is to say, that there is
no error; or else by the infinitely small is meant the
state of a magnitude at its vanishing point or its begin-
ning, conceived after the pattern of magnitudes already
actualized. [Leibniz 1710a] (translation by Gutenberg
Project)
The closing phrase,
or else by the infinitely small is meant the state of a mag-
nitude at its vanishing point or its beginning, conceived
after the pattern of magnitudes already actualized,
was truncated by Ishiguro. In this omission she is not without co-
conspirators: the same truncated passage appears in [Goldenbaum 2008,
p. 76] and [Ferraro 2008, p. 29].
Leibniz’s conclusion in § 70 suggests that there does exist a way of
working with infinitesimals a` la rigueur. This would presumably in-
volve an enriched system of magnitudes, whose additional elements
shared properties with the (already actualized) elements in the original
system. Leibniz is being rather vague here and it is hard to know what
he means exactly by magnitudes being “conceived after the pattern
of magnitudes already actualized,” especially since § 70 is preceded by
§ 69 on free will and followed by § 71 on the Gospels, making it difficult
to rely on the context for a clarification. However, our impression is
that Ishiguro is not telling the full story here, for she observes:
As the Theodicy is a very late book (1710), it may be
thought that this expresses a later-year shift to finitism
brought about by senility. In order to see that this is not
the case, let us trace some of the things Leibniz wrote
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on infinitesimals from his early years. [Ishiguro 1990,
p. 83] [emphasis added]
To be sure, Ishiguro soon enough rejects her senility hypothesis. How-
ever, even a hypothesis that is ultimately rejected must have a grain
of plausibility to it. Otherwise why would one want to consider it in
the first place? Note that the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence is well-
regarded, and it comes at the very end of Leibniz’s life. Leibniz died
in 1716 before he had a chance to respond to Clarke’s 5th letter.
Ishiguro’s thought here seems at odds with her stated goal of de-
fending Leibniz’s honor (see Section 1). Her thought seems to imply
that Leibniz shifted to an infinitesimal-barring finitism in 1710. The
truth is that, on the contrary, Leibniz was at that time at the height
of his intellectual powers, and was as committed as ever to developing
the B-methodology, including its foundations, as is evidenced by his
extremely lucid 1710 text on the transcendental law of homogeneity
[Leibniz 1710b] analyzed in Section 3.
7.3. Nova Methodus. Ishiguro’s third piece of textual evidence is
drawn from Nova Methodus [Leibniz 1684] (a text she misdates at
1685). She makes several dubious claims related to this work.
First, she alleges that in this text, differentials are “defined through
the proportion of finite line segments” [Ishiguro 1990, p. 83]. What
Leibniz actually writes is the following:
Now some right line taken arbitrarily may be called dx,
and the right line which shall be to dx, as v (or w, y, z,
resp.) is to V B (or WC, Y D, ZE, respect.) may be
called dv (or dw, dy, dz, resp.), or the differentials . . .
[Leibniz 1684, p. 467].
This passage in a notoriously (and deliberately) obscure work cannot
qualify as a definition of differential, and certainly offers no support for
Ishiguro’s claim that infinitesimal expressions are non-referring. Leib-
niz scholars have argued that he had to conceal the use of infinitesimals
in this publication to avoid the wrath of opponents:
The structure of the text [i.e., Nova Methodus ], which
was much more concise and complex than the primitive
Parisian manuscript essays, was complicated by the need
to conceal the use of infinitesimals. Leibniz was well
aware of the possible objections he would receive from
mathematicians linked to classic tradition who would
have stated that the infinitely small quantities were not
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rigorously defined, that there was not yet a theory capa-
ble of proving their existence and their operations, and
hence they were not quite acceptable in mathematics.
[Roero 2005, p. 49] [emphasis added]
This would account for the obscurities of Leibniz’s discussion of dif-
ferentials here, which offers no support at all for a syncategorematic
reading of Leibnizian infinitesimals.
Furthoremore, Ishiguro goes on to provide a syncategorematic inter-
pretation of Leibniz’s construction of a line through a pair of infinitely
close points:
Leibniz writes that a tangent is found to be a straight
line drawn between two points on a curve of infinitely
small distance, or a side of a polygon of infinite angles.
However, . . . infinitely small distances can be thought
of as distances that can be taken smaller than any dis-
tances that are given. [Ishiguro 1990, p. 84].
This passage furnishes no explanation for the asymmetry of the two
points involved in the received definition of the tangent line via secant
lines (as discussed in Section 8).
As we already mentioned in Section 3, Nova Methodus contains the
first mention of Leibniz’s law of homogeneity, evidence in favor of in-
finitesimals a` la rigueur. Thus, the clues contained in Nova Methodus
support the B > A reading.
7.4. Responsio a Nieuwentijt . Ishiguro’s fourth piece of textual
evidence is the 1695 response to Nieuwentijt [Leibniz 1695b] published
in Acta Eruditorum. She writes that
Leibniz explains that although he treats (assumo) infin-
itely small lines dx and dy as true quantities sui generis,
this is just because he found them useful for reason-
ing and discovery. I take it that he is treating them as
convenient theoretical fictions because using signs which
looks [sic] as if they stand for quantities sui generis is
useful. [Ishiguro 1990, p. 84] [emphasis added]
In point of fact, theoretical fictions are on a par with what we refer to
as pure fictions. What Ishiguro writes here undermines her syncate-
gorematic interpretation and supports ours. The fact that this is what
the passage means is demonstrated by the comparison with imaginar-
ies, for which Leibniz has no syncategorematic account. The passage
Ishiguro is referring to reads as follows:
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Itaque non tantum lineas infinite parvas, ut dx, dy, pro
quantitatibus veris in suo genere assumo, sed et earum
quadrata vel rectangula dxdx, dydy, dxdy, idemque de
cubis aliisque altioribus sentio, praesertim cum eas ad
ratiocinandum inveniendumque utiles reperiam.17
[Leibniz 1695b, p. 322].
According to Ishiguro, Leibniz says that he treats dx and dy as true
quantities sui generis just because he found them useful. But is that
really what he is saying? Leibniz refers to infinitesimals by the adjective
veris meaning “true” or “real”. If his infinitesimals were logical fictions
i.e., merely shorthand for sequences of real values, what novelty would
there be in emphasizing, as he does, that he includes infinitesimals (as
well as those of higher order) among what he describes as true or real
quantities? Why emphasize this point if infinitesimals were merely
shorthand for sequences of what are already ordinary values drawn
from an Archimedean system? Furthermore, why would he seek to
buttress such a straightforward point by underscoring the usefulness of
infinitesimals in reasoning and discovery?
A few lines earlier on page 322, Leibniz cites Euclid V.518 in a way
similar to the 1695 letter to l’Hoˆpital, indicating a violation of the
Archimedean property; see Section 8. Remarkably, Leibniz uses the
term numerus infinitus, meaning infinite number–rather than infinite
quantity–here, blocking the option of interpreting it as a variable quan-
tity increasing without bound.19
Leibniz not only speaks of two distinct methods but gives them
names that suggest what his personal preferences are. Namely, Leib-
niz describes what we refer to as the A-method as reducendi via (the
way of reducing)20 and the infinitesimal method as methodus directa
(the direct method). It is instructive to analyze the relevant passage
in detail. Leibniz writes in this Responsio:
17This is translated as follows by Parmentier: “Ainsi au nombre des grandeurs
re´elles en leur genre, je ne compte pas seulement les lignes infiniment petites dx, dy,
mais aussi leurs carre´s ou leurs produits dxdx, dxdy, dydy, il en va de meˆme d’apre`s
moi de leurs cubes et de leurs puissances supe´rieures, compte tenu notamment
de la fe´condite´ que j’y ai de´couverte dans les raisonnements et les inventions.”
[Leibniz 1989, p. 328].
18This corresponds to V.4 in modern editions; see footnote 12.
19Parmentier in his 1989 French translation devotes a lengthy footnote 30 on
page 325 to Leibniz’s usage of the term numerus here.
20This was rendered cette de´monstration re´gressive in Parmentier’s translation
[Leibniz 1989, p. 327].
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Quoniam tamen methodus directa brevior est ad intelli-
gendum et utilior ad inveniendum, sufficit cognita semel
reducendi via postea methodum adhiberi, in qua incom-
parabiliter minora negliguntur, quae sane et ipsa secum
fert demonstrationem suam secundum lemmata a me
Febr. 1689 communicata. [Gerhardt 1850-1863], vol. V,
p. 322.
We translate this passage as follows:
But since the direct method [methodus directa] is shorter
to understand and a more useful way of finding [i.e., dis-
covering], it suffices, once the way of reducing [reducendi
via] is known, to apply afterward the method in which
quantities that are incomparably smaller are neglected,
which in fact carries its own demonstration according to
the lemmas that I communicated in February, 1689.
What emerges from this sentence is that there are two distinct meth-
ods, [A] “via reduction” and [B] a “direct method” using infinitesimals.
The infinitesimal method is riskier but more powerful, and what Leibniz
is pointing out is that having gained some experience with the tradi-
tional method so that one already knows what kind of results to expect,
one can safely used the infinitesimal method that yields the same re-
sults but more efficiently. Leibniz points out that once the reductive
method A has been used and understood, from that point onward one
can systematically use the direct method B (which involves discarding
infinitesimals), since it is quicker and more useful. These clues furnish
further evidence in favor of the B > A reading over the B = A reading
(see Section 4).
7.5. The 7 june 1698 letter to Bernoulli. Ishiguro’s fifth piece of
textual evidence is the 7 june 1698 letter to Bernoulli [Leibniz 1698].21
She writes that Leibniz likens the status of infinitesimals to that of
imaginary numbers in this letter (ibid., p. 84).
Since Ishiguro does not elaborate any further, it is difficult to see
how this could be interpreted as a piece of evidence in favor of her logi-
cal fiction hypothesis, since in point of fact complex numbers could not
(in Leibniz’s day) be replaced by quantified paraphrases ranging over
ordinary numbers, so complex numbers (or imaginary quantities, as
Leibniz called them) are pure fictions par excellence. Leibniz repeat-
edly insisted (not merely in this letter to Bernoulli) on the analogy
21Ishiguro gives the page range as 499-500. Actually the letter occupies four pages
497-500.
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between the fictional status of infinitesimals and complex numbers.
Meanwhile, Leibniz described imaginaries as having their fundamen-
tum in re (basis in fact) in [Leibniz 1695a, p. 93]. The comparison
to complex numbers tends to undermine the logical fiction hypothesis
concerning Leibnizian infinitesimals. This theme was explored more
fully in [Sherry & Katz 2014].
8. Euclid V.4, Apollonius, and tangent line
According to the letter to l’Hospital [Leibniz 1695a], Leibniz’s in-
finitesimals violate Euclid V.4:22
J’appelle grandeurs incomparables dont l’une multiplie´e
par quelque nombre fini que ce soit, ne sc¸auroit exceder
l’autre, de la meˆme fac¸on qu’Euclide la pris dans sa cin-
quieme definition du cinquieme livre. [Leibniz 1695a,
p. 288]
Note Leibniz’s use of the term grandeur, i.e., magnitude, rather than
the more ambiguous term quantity. A magnitude (e.g., 5 feet) is a
level of a quantity (length). Here the option of interpreting this as
shorthand for variable quantity is not available, barring also a logical
fiction reading. The definition Leibniz refers to is a variant of what is
known today as the Archimedean property of continua. This indicates
that Leibniz embraces what we refer to as a Bernoullian continuum
(though certainly not a non-Archimedean continuum in a modern set-
theoretic sense), contrary to Ishiguro’s Chapter 5.
[Jesseph 2015] shows that strategies Leibniz employed in the attempt
to show that such fictions are acceptable because the use of infinitesi-
mals can ultimately be eliminated have to presume the correctness of an
infinitesimal inference (i.e., inference exploiting infinitesimals), namely
identifying the tangent line to a curve as part of the construction. In
the case of conic sections this strategy succeeds because the tangents
are already known from Apollonius. But for general curves (includ-
ing transcendental ones treated by Leibniz), infinitesimals a` la rigueur
remain an irreducible part of the Leibnizian framework, contrary to
Ishiguro’s Chapter 5.
In 1684, Leibniz wrote as follows concerning the tangent line:
. . . to find a tangent is to draw a straight line, which
joins two points of the curve having an infinitely small
difference . . . [Leibniz 1684]
22Leibniz actually refers to V.5; see footnote 12.
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The definition of a tangent line as the line through a pair of infinitely
close points on the curve poses a challenge to a proto-Weierstrassian
reading. Such a reading involves having to fix one of the points and
to vary the other, and construct a sequence of secant lines producing
the tangent line in the limit. In such a reading, one of Leibniz’s points
would be a genuine mathematical concept (the future point of tan-
gency), while the other, merely a syncategorematic device or a short-
hand for a sequence of ordinary values.
However, nothing whatsoever about Leibniz’s wording would indi-
cate that there is such an asymmetry between the two points, and on
the contrary implies a symmetry between them: either both denote, or
neither denotes. Leibniz’s definition of the tangent line is at odds with
Ishiguro’s Chapter 5.
The most devastating blow to Ishiguro’s Chapter 5 is the hierarchi-
cal structure on the Leibnizian dx’s, dx2’s, ddx’s, etc., ubiquitous in
Leibniz’s texts. One can replace dx by a sequence of finite values ǫ
n
and furnish a concealed quantifier incorporated into a hidden proto-
Weierstrassian limit notion so as to interpret dx as shorthand for the
sequence 〈ǫ
n
: n ∈ N〉. However, one notices that lim
n→∞ ǫn = 0, as
well as lim
n→∞ ǫ
2
n
= 0, and also unsurprisingly lim
n→∞(ǫn + ǫ
2
n
) = 0.
Thus, the Leibnizian substitution dx + dx2 = dx in accordance with
the TLH becomes a meaningless tautology 0 + 0 = 0. To interpret it
in a meaningful fashion, Ishiguro would have to introduce additional
ad hoc proto-Weierstrassian devices23 with no shadow of a hint in the
original Leibniz.
9. Conclusion
Leibniz on occasion writes that arguments using infinitesimals (B-
track terminology) could be paraphrased in terms of ordinary numbers
drawn from an Archimedean number system (A-track terminology).
The question we have investigated is what exactly is involved in such
a paraphrase. Ishiguro argued that Leibnizian infinitesimals do not
designate, so that when one clarifies the logical content of his propo-
sitions mentioning infinitesimals, the infinitesimals disappear and one
is left with a suitable quantified proposition. Ishiguro’s claim is that
Leibnizian infinitesimals are logical fictions. We have argued that Leib-
nizian infinitesimals are pure fictions not eliminable by paraphrase.
This does not mean that Leibniz’s infinitesimals are Robinson’s in-
finitesimals; far from it. The well-known differences between them
23E.g., for every positive epsilon there exists a positive delta such that whenever dx
is less than delta, the difference
∣
∣
∣
dx+dx
2
dx
− 1
∣
∣
∣ is less than epsilon.
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(Leibniz’s continuum being nonpunctiform whereas Robinson’s, punc-
tiform) should be approached from the viewpoint of the distinction be-
tween mathematical practice and the ontology of mathematical entities
developed in [Benacerraf 1965], [Quine 1968]. What emerges from our
analysis is that modern infinitesimal frameworks provide better prox-
ies for understanding Leibnizian procedures and actual mathematical
practice than the Weierstrassian framework (similarly punctiform, like
Robinson’s) Ishiguro seeks to read into Leibniz.
Ishiguro’s syncategorematic reading is contrary to explicit Leibnizian
texts, such as his 1695 texts Responsio to Nieuwentijt and letter to
l’Hopital where he writes that his differentials violate Euclid Def. V.4,
closely related to the Archimedean property of continua. Leibniz de-
scribes B-track methods as being direct and A-track methods as in-
volving (indirect) reductio arguments, implying distinct methodologies.
Leibniz repeatedly likens infinitesimals to imaginaries, and at least once
described the latter as having their fundamentum in re (basis in fact),
suggesting that both are entities. In some cases, Ishiguro resorts to
misrepresentation of what Leibniz wrote so as to buttress her position
(see Subsection 6.2 on the possibility of addition of incomparables).
In view of all the difficulties with Ishiguro’s reading, we can only
conclude that the legitimate grounds for a “rehabilitation” (if any is
needed) of Leibniz’s infinitesimal calculus are to be found in the Leib-
nizian theory itself24 (including his transcendental law of homogeneity),
rather than in either Fregean quantifiers, Weierstrassian epsilontics, or
Russellian logical fictions.
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